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I
THE OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKET
HE FOUR teletype machines click out their monotonous sym-
phony of sounds. The ticker tape rolls off the private wires con-
necting this office with branch offices and corresponding firms through-
out the country. Lights flash on the six direct lines to local dealers.
The floor is strewn with tape and other debris, and smoke fills the air-
conditioned atmosphere. The din of talk and sound is overwhelming
as the four assistant traders and the chief trader carry on their vocation.
This is the trading room of the X Company, a moderate-sized securities
dealer. Similar activity of lesser and greater proportions is going on
simultaneously in the trading rooms of securities firms throughout the
country.
The chief trader is busy marking off his tally sheet, keeping track
of his firm's position in twenty-five or more securities. Now a call
from a customer's man over a direct line: "Market in ABC Company,
have buyer for 1,ooo shares."
"Minute, please. We don't do it."
A flick of the switch on a direct line to a local dealer: "Market in
ABC."
Reply: "Inside market eighteen cents bid, twenty cents ask."
"How long may have ask price on io,ooo share firm?"
"Thirty minutes."
Flick of another switch and back to the customer's man. "Have
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i0,ooo share firm at twenty cents for thirty minutes. Offer to customer
at twenty-five cents."'
The teletype is demanding a reply: "B-D Securities Company call-
ing, your market, please, in XYZ Company stock."
"One dollar ask and $1.25 bid," the trader types back.
"Size, please?"
"Market good for 5,ooo shares either way."
"We have bought i,ooo shares from you at $1.25."
"We have sold you i,ooo shares at $1.25."
A quick notation of the order, which is then time stamped.
A lull in the trading activity occurs, and the chief trader hands an
assistant a list of five securities traded by the X Company and instructs
him as follows: "Check other markets in these securities for me."
Another trader is yelling across the room. "What is best market
for Missile, Inc., stock?"
The chief trader glances at a set of pink sheets and replies, "Acme,
Ganmor, Plush, and Continental all do it. Try Continental."
The tape is rolling off the private wire. A branch office is asking
when trading will commence in Natural Resources, Inc., (Natural)
stock. The chief trader replies, "At opening of the market tomorrow."
"But B-D Securities Company is already making a market," the
branch office complains.
"Sorry, but they were not part of the underwriting group. Counsel
advises we cannot commence trading until seven days from close of the
underwriting.' All branch offices be prepared to give me your orders
in the morning."
This, then, is a bird's eye view of a small segment of the over-the-
counter market. A market consisting of thousands of securities dealers
'The transaction described is a so-called riskless transaction effected on a principal
basis. Under concepts developed by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
National Association of Securities Dealers, a dealer must, in this type of transaction,
charge a price reasonably related to the market price. The dealer's mark-up in the
illustration of 50 (z5%) probably is enough to put him out of business. See Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 85o-62 (1951).
' Counsel is concerned with Rule 1 7 C.F.R. § 240.IoB-6 (x955), adopted pursuant
to § xo(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193+, 48 Stat. 891, i5 U.S.C. § 7 8j(b)
(1952), which precludes a dealer from trading in a security it has underwritten until
the distribution is completed. Since purchasers of the distributed shares in effect have
7 business days in which to pay, 48 Stat. 891 (1934)
, 
i5 U.S.C. § 7 8k(d) (934);
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4044, Feb. 4, 19485 the underwriter does not know
to what extent he may have cancellations until the 7 days have expired. Accordingly,
out of an abundance of caution, counsel does not regard the distribution as completed
until all shares have been paid for.
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linked together by the sundry services of American Telephone & Tele-
graph Company, and constituting a multitude of individual decision-
making centers, each with one objective-to realize a profit by selling
shares for a few cents more than it pays for them. This profit-seeking
objective, incidentally, provides an essential service to our system of
capitalism, for it provides a secondary market for unlisted securities
and thereby assures investors the liquidity so necessary to entice capital
to venture.
The over-the-counter market consists of approximately 5,ooo dealers
who are members of the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) and a substantial number of nonmember dealers. Many
dealers are strictly retail dealers, in the sense that they make no primary
markets in a security, but merely fill customers' orders by buying or
selling for the customer from or to other dealers who make primary
markets. Such broker-dealers may act as principals, in which event they
buy from or sell to their customer, but rely on purchases or sales, as the
case may be, from or to other dealers to complete such transactions.
Other dealers are strictly dealer's dealers-that is, they buy and sell
securities only from and to other dealers. These dealers are making a
primary wholesale market in the particular securities they trade. Still
other dealers make primary'markets *and retail the same securities to
their customers.
A dealer making a primary market in a security is prepared at all
times, within limits, to buy or sell that security: at the quoted price.
Such a dealer must be prepared to assume a position, whether short or
long,3 in a security, in that it is seldom possible precisely to balance buy
and sell orders at a particular price. Although there is little empirical
evidence available, dealers making a primary market, on balance, prob-
ably tend to be long in the security. A dealer may make a primary
market in several securities, or in only one or t few securities. There
may be several dealers, or only a few dealers, and occasionally only
one dealer making a primary market in a particular security. Even if
several dealers make a primary market in a particular security, in many
instances a particular dealer will effectuate a large percentage of the
transactions. 4
'A dealer who is short in this context has sold more shares than be has-bought. A
dealer who is long has bought more shares than he has sold.
"A dealer actively competing attempts to effectuate a large percentage of the trans-
actions in the security by having the best market for the security-that is, by being
willing to pay more for the security and to sell the security for less than other dealers.
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The over-the-counter market is linked together by a teletype system,
private wires, and the telephone. Although transactions are effectuated
and quotations obtained by such means of communication, it is the
National Daily Quotation Sheets, popularly known as the "pink sheets"
because of their color, that is the basis for much of this traffic. Pub-
lished daily on business days by a private organization and subscribed
to by most over-the-counter dealers, it is available in three sections-
Eastern, Midwestern, and Pacific.' Subscribing dealers daily place
quotations in the sheets for securities in which they trade. Such quo-
tations usually include bid and ask prices, but sometimes they are merely
in the form of OW (offer wanted) and BW (bid wanted). Occasion-
ally the dealer indicates the number of shares he is willing to sell or
buy, but more often the size of the market is not indicated. While
fictitious quotations are prohibited in theory, generally there is no
effective way to determine from the Sheets the size of the dealer's
market. The Sheets are often used by dealers inserting quotes who are
merely looking for a buyer or seller for one small block of stock, but
more often they are employed by dealers making a primary market to
inform other dealers of their market. There may be from one to
several dealers quoting a market in a particular security on a given day.
Subscribing dealers use their daily copy to determine who is making a
market in a particular security, to determine the best apparent market
in the security, and to compare their market with that of other dealers.
The over-the-counter market has no shape nor form. It is a desul-
tory, unorganized, ill-defined market completely dependent on the
whims, views, and decisions of thousands of dealers with no common
denominator other than the profit motive. There is no central reporting
agency and no way to determine the extent of a day's transactions in a
particular security except in retrospect, and then inadequately.
II
REGULATION OF THE OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKET
The typical over-the-counter securities dealer is subject to regulation
by the appropriate state securities commission, the United States Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, and the NASD. The NASD, al-
though a voluntary organization, was formed pursuant to section i A
Generally each section will carry quotations for securities primarily traded in the
particular geographic area; -It is not uncommon, however, for a dealer to subscribe to
more than one section.
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of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,' and decisions of the Board of
Governors of the NASD, disciplining dealers, are subject to review by
the SEC. The bulk of the business conducted in the over-the-counter
market is undoubtedly by members of the NASD. The NASD is
divided into Business Districts, each with a full-time secretary and a
small staff. The principal sanctions imposed by the Association are
expulsion and suspension from membership, and fines. The initial
decision is made by the District Committee, consisting of representatives
of the industry within the District, and this decision is subject to re-
view by a panel of the Board of Governors, also selected from the
industry. The NASD is an outstanding example of industry self-
xegulation, and industry representatives have on occasion been notably
severe in imposing sanctions on their own members-albeit, frequently
against the less substantial ones. In practice, the SEC depends largely
on the NASD to enforce mark-up policies and compliance with Regu-
lation T . 7
By and large, no real effort is made by the NASD nor state securi-
ties commissions to police market manipulations, and, accordingly, the
functions of such commissions and the NASD in the regulation of the
over-the-counter market are beyond the scope of this article. The SEC
observes securities markets closely and is sensitive to rapid fluctuations
in the market prices of securities. This article examines in detail the
principles evolved by the SEC in policing over-the-counter-market
trading activities.
III
THE MARKET IN ACTION
Returning to the narrative description of trading by the X Company
and excerpting its trading activities in the stock of Natural Resources,
Inc., (Natural) from its other trading activities, we left the chief trader
advising the branch offices that he would open the market in Natural
the following day.
Trading by the X Company commences the following morning in
Natural stock:
The chief trader on teletype to B-D Securities Company, which,
S5z Stat. 1079 (938), 5 U.S.C. § 780-3 (1952).
Regulation T regulates the extension of credit by broker;dealers in securities trans-
actions and has been adopted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
pursuant to § 7(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,,4.8 Stat. 886 (1934), I5
U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1952).
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as previously noted, has been making a primary market in Natural:
"Market, please, in Natural."
B-D Securities Company: "Twelve-fifteen."
The chief trader to branch offices and salesmen: "Orders and indica-
tions for Natural stock, please."
The chief trader is advised as to orders and indications of interest,
which suggest more potential buyers than sellers.
The chief trader to branch offices and salesmen: "Retail market
[market to customers] Natural eleven cents bid, sixteen cents ask;
inside market [market to other dealers] twelve cents bid, fifteen cents
ask." 8
Trading ensues at these prices until the X company is short 40,000
shares. The chief trader raises his retail quotation to fifteen cents bid-
eighteen cents ask and attempts to buy at the current bid price sufficient
shares to cover sales at the previous ask price." As his short position
continues for a period of several days, the X Company trader continues
to raise his bid and ask prices, but he raises his bid price only to the
extent he believes necessary to buy sufficient shares to cover at a profit
sales at his last ask price. By the, end of, two weeks, the market made
by the X Company is twenty cents bid-twenty-two cents ask, and the
X Company is still several thousand shares short. Numerous sellers
now appear at the current bid price, and the chief trader buys only
enough shares at this price to cover his short sales at twenty-two cents,
then reduces his price to eighteen cents bid-twenty cents ask.' 0 Supply
continues to exceed demand, and the trader successively lowers his bid
and ask prices, buying shares at the current bid price only to the extent
he is short shares at a price above the current bid price and to the extent
necessary to supply current demand.
In the meantime, an SEC staff member in Washington has been
scanning the Daily Quotation Sheets over a period of several days, and
'The significance of this opening quotation and the manner in which it was deter-
mined is discussed infra at p. 21o. A penny stock is used for illustrative purposes to
avoid the inconvehience of using fractions.
*Presumably the X Company has sold 40,000 shares at 160 in excess of what it has
bought at x1. Accordingly,- the X Company will realize a profit on" all shares bought
at its current bid price of i50 up to 40,000 plus the shares it is able to sell at its current
ask price. However, maintaining a spread between bid and ask price sufficient to permit
covering a short position at a 'profit in this manner may evidence control and domina-
tion of the market. Sterling Securities Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6ioo,
Nov. 2, 1959.
10 "For example, assuming the X Company was short io,ooo shares, which it sold at
22¢, the X Company buys io,ooo shares (plus additional shares needed to cover current
sales at 2z2, if any), but no more at 2oO, and then lowers its bid to 180.
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has noted the increase in quotations of Natural from eleven cents bid
to twenty cents bid. A preliminary inquiry is made to determine
whether there have been significant developments in the affairs of
Natural to warrant the price increase, and the answer appears to be
negative. An investigation file is opened, and a staff member is assigned
to conduct a trading quiz. As part of the trading quiz, a trading in-
spector examines all of the trades in Natural by the X Company during
a specified period. The transactions of other dealers known"1 to or
likely to have trades in Natural during the same period are determined
by direct examination or questionnaire. The result is a composite
schedule showing every known transaction in Natural during a specified
period, the name and address of every buyer and seller, and the price
at which each transaction was effected. A representative group of pur-
chasers of Natural during this period is interviewed. The staff recom-
mends and the Commission enters an order directing the opening of a
proceeding to determine whether the broker-dealer registration of the
X Company should be revoked.
A. The Charge
The Commission's order alleges reason to believe that the X Com-
pany, for the period February i 1959, to April 30, 1959, violated
section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,12 section io(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 and rules thereunder, 8 and section
.15(c) (I) of the Exchange Act of 1934 and rules thereunder, 4 in that
it willfully made false statements and omitted to state material facts
concerning, among other things, the market for Natural stock, the
market price of the stock, and the X Company's domination and con-
trol of the market. The action sounds in fraud-the failure to disclose
control and domination, thereby making misleading the implied repre-
sentation that the prices charged were determined in a free and com-
petitive market."
Section nine of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the anti-
" The SEC investigator determines who has transactions in a particular security by
noting the dealers who place quotations for the security in the Sheets, by examination
of one dealer's records disclosing transactions with other dealers, and by inquiry of other
dealers who may be familiar with this particular trading market.
1248 Stat. 84 (933), -5 U.S.C. §77q(a) (95.).
348 Stat. 891 (934), 5 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1952) ; 7 C.F.R. § z4o.iob-5 (z949).
1t48 Stat. 895 (934) -5 U.S.C. §78o(c)(I) (1952); 17 C.F.R. §24o.xS-
(949)-
" R. L. Emacio & Co., 35 S.E.C. 191 (.953).
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manipulation section, does not refer to control and domination as being
unlawful, but generally makes unlawful
i. wash sales;' 6
2. matched orders, 7 entered into for the purpose of creating a false
or misleading appearance of active trading;
3. creating actual or apparent trading in a security or raising the
price of a security for the purpose of inducing others to purchase;' 8
and
4. false representations pertaining to a security while buying and
selling such security. 9
Although section nine by its terms is limited to securities listed on a
national securities exchange, the Commission has made section nine
applicable to registered dealers trading in over-the-counter securities.2"
The Commission has rejected the argument that since the over-the-
counter market is a private market in which transactions are not publi.
cized, the antimanipulation provisions are not applicable.21  Nonethe-
less, the Commission's staff was impressed with the argument to the
extent that the failure to disclose domination and control of the market
rather than violation of the antimanipulation provisions is the ground
generally relied upon as the basis of the charges. Inasmuch as the
cases are tried in a fraud context, it would appear that a dealer could
avoid control and domination charges by disclosing the fact of such
control and domination. However, when one dealer informed cus-
tomers that he manipulated a particular market, the Commission held
that this disclosure was not sufficient, because the dealer failed to dis-
dose that such manipulation was unlawful. 22  Presumably, the activity
18 A wash sale of a security involves a sale in which there is no change in the bene-
ficial ownership of a security. 48 Stat. 889, I5 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (1) (195z).
" A matched order consists of an order to purchase or sell a security, with the
knowledge that an offsetting order or orders of substantially the same size, at substan-
tially the same time, and at substantially the same price, has been or will be entered by
or for the same or different parties. 48 Stat. 889, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (i) (1952)5
Wright v. SEC, 1iz F.zd 89 (zd Cir. 1940).
s 48 Stat. 889 (1934), -5 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (z) (1952) ; M.S. Wien & Co., 24 S.E.C.
4 (1946) i Kidder, Peabody & Co., is S.E.C. 559 (945). Although the manipulation
provisions are applicable to deliberate efforts to depress the price of a security, because
of the infrequency of such situations, they are not discussed in this article.
10 48 Stat. 889 (93), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(4) (1952).
.0o 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c-z (1949) ; Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 319 (1941).
"2Halsey, Stuart & Co., 30 S.E.C. io6, 127 (1949). The Commission recently
reaffirmed this view in Gob Shops of America, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 4075,
May 6, 1959.
"2 Shelly-Roberts & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5837, Dec. 22, 1958.
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was unlawful because of section nine,23 in which event disclosure could
not have remedied the situation. As is noted below, the theory adopted
can affect the practical consequences to dealers.
B. The Proof
The Government's case as presented at the hearing is essentially
documentary and represents a summary of the information obtained
in the trading quiz and information gathered from the National Daily
Quotation Sheets. A summary of the Government's summary of the
trading quiz discloses the following:
TRADING IN NATURAL RESOURCES, INC.
All Known Dealer
Number Transactions Transactions by X Company
Period Market Range of days
traded Percent
Purchases Sales Total Purchases Sales Total Days of
Traded Total
2/6/59 llclow 20ohigh 50 1,000,000 950,000 1,950,000 850,000 925,000 1,775,000 48 93%
thz bid bid
4/20/59
In addition, the following appears: The X Company placed quotations
in the Daily Quotation Sheets on all fifty trading days; on thirty-five
of the trading days, it was the only dealer to place quotations in the
sheets; on forty-five of the trading days, it had the highest bid in the
sheets; the X Company's purchases on six occasions raised the price of
the stock; the X Company raised its bid price in the sheets on five occa-
sions; and the X Company repurchased shares from other dealers and
customers at prices higher than it had previously sold them to such
dealers and customers.
The X Company's evidence establishes the trading pattern hereto-
fore outlined.
C. The Classical Manipulation Distinguished
The case established by the Commission's staff is not the classical
manipulation. As long as some men are moved by the desire to make
a "killing," the classic manipulator will be with us. In essence, his
_- Section 9(a)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides (with respect
to a listed security) that it is unlawful to represent that the price of a security will in-
crease as the result of any person's market activities. 48 Stat. 889 (1934)
, 
I5 U.S.C.
§ 7 8i(a) (3) (1952).
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scheme is a comparatively simple one, involving the raising of the price
of a security by a series of purchases designed to (I) restrict the floating
supply, (!z) create the appearance of activity, and (3) cause others to
purchase the security as the result of the apparent activity and rising
prices.
If the manipulator is an over-the-counter dealer, these activities are
supplemented by inflated quotations in the National Daily Quotation
Sheets and the local newspapers. The dealer in this situation may be
encouraging his salesmen to create activity through false representa-
tions as to the Company's prospects and may have in his employ paid
touts, including other dealers, who are induced also to place quotations
in the Sheets and who run subsidized newspaper ads recommending
the manipulated security. The motive is not difficult to find-(i)
either the dealer owns or has under option a large block of stock which
he disposes of at the manipulated price, or (2) the dealer is conditioning
the market for a public offering by the issuer which the dealer is to
underwrite. The Commission has found this type of manipulation in
numerous cases 
24
IV
DOMINATION BY THE SPECIALIST
The "Government's" case as outlined does not fit into the classical
manipulation pattern. Rather the pattern is one common to the trading
activities of many over-the-counter dealers specializing in and making
a market in a particular over-the-counter security. The disturbing fact
is that the Commission's staff apparently regards such activities as un-
lawful, at least when coupled with retail sales, and the Commission not
only has relied in large part on this type of evidence in drawing the
inference that a dealer "controlled and dominated" a market, but has
used language in its opinions tending to confirm the views of the staff.
The Commission's decisions are usually clouded by the fact that it re-
sists efforts to fractionate the staff's case and generally has considered
the foregoing type of evidence with other more apparent evidence of
manipulation in drawing the inference of control and domination.
The Commission has indicated that one of the evils involved in this
situation is the failure of the dealer to disclose that he is the principal
2'R.J. Koeppe & Co. v. SEC, 95 F.2d 55o (7th Cir. 1938); Michael J. Meehan,
2 S.E.C. 588 (1937)5 Charles C. Wright, 3 S.E.C. 19o (1938) Harold T. White,
3 S.E.C. 466 (1938); Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 319 (94i) ; The Federal Corp., 25
S.E.C. 227 (1947); R. L. Emaclo & Co., 35 S.E.C. 191 (s953).
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(if not only) market for the security. The Commission has stated in
this regard: 25
... Purchasers did not know that they were being subjected to the hazards
inherent in a situation where the withdrawal of support by the persons domi-
nating the market would mean the closing of the only available forum for
trading in such security.
Disregarding the question-begging terms "support" and "dominating,"
we may have isolated the real culprit-the failure to disclose that since
X dealer is the only dealer making a market in the security, if he
should discontinue making such market, there might very well be no
market for the security. If this is the evil aimed at, a remedy is avail-
able-disclosure. This disclosure could be accomplished in part by
placing in the confirmation statement the following or similar legend:
"X Company makes a primary market in the security confirmed and
may from time to time be the only market for the security." The
problem of making the disclosure prior to the transaction is a more
cumbersome one, and the writer has no feasible suggestions for its
solution.26
The Commission has an expres's rule precluding a dealer from
representing in a primary or secondary distribution that the shares are
being offered "at the market" or at a price related to the market price,
unless such dealer has reasonable grounds to believe that a market for
the security exists independent of the dealer or an associate or affiliate
of the dealer.2T  The over-all effect of the foregoing decision may be
to apply similar principles to the over-the-counter market generally,
although the fact that the rule is more limited in scope is some basis
for contending that the Commission deliberately refrained from adopt-
ing this position. In any event, since the Commission finds an implied
representation that the price quoted by a dealer is the market price,2 8
it may be necessary, from a disclosure standpoint, to negative such im-
plied fepresentation.
2 S. T. Jackson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 631, 656 (1950).
"
8 A comparable problem occurs with respect to 17 C.F.R. § 24 o.ISC 1-5 (1949),
which requires a broker-dealer controlling an issuer to disclose this fact in all trans-
actions with customers pertaining to such issuer before entering into any contract. One
possible solution is to make the disclosure in the confirmation and provide that the cus-
tomer has 74 hours to accept or reject the transaction.
" Id. § 24o.15C x-8.
"
8SEC v. Otis & Co., 18 F. Supp. ioo (N.D. Ohio 1936); R.L. Emacio & Co,,
35 S.E.C. 191 (1953).
The vice of a manipulation, the Commission has said, is that it dis-
torts 11... the character of the market as a reflection of the confirmed
judgment of buyers and sellers, and... make[s] of it a stage-managed
performance .... 129 This type of evil probably cannot be remedied
by disclosure; the antimanipulation provisions of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 expressly recognize this fact by making it unlawful
for a person to represent that the price of a security is likely to increase
as the result of his (or someone else's) market activities." Do the
ordinary trading practices of an over-the-counter specialist involve this
type of market interference? The over~the-counter dealer making the
primary market in a local security which is infrequently traded, or in
a security in which there is a so-called "thin market" or in which the
market is virtually nonexistent, is relatively free of market forces and
dominates and controls the market. 1 Thus, the activities of the dealer
have been found to constitute control and domination because of the
presence of all of the following factors: 2
i. the limited size and very local character of the market;
2. the unlikelihood of an independent market developing;
3. the dealer's customers posed special trust and confidence in him,
relying on his recommendations implicitly; and
4. as a result of the dealer's relationship with his customers, he
controlled their investment decisions and used such control to cause
some customers to buy and others to sell-in effect, his customers were
buying and selling on the dealer's recommendation, at prices he
determined.
A dealer buying from and selling to customers on the basis of such
a market must make the fullest disclosure as to the nature of the mar-
ket, and in many instances must as a minimum disclose that there is, in
fact, no market.88 Even in the light of the most complete disclosure,
as discussed above, the dealer's control and domination may be unlaw-
ful. Accordingly, in this type of situation, a' broker-dealer would be
well advised to inform the customer that there is no market in the
:9 Halsey, Stuart & Co., 30 S.E.C. io6, liz (1949).
048 Stat. 889 ('934), 15 U.s.C. § 78i(a)(3) (952).
W"W. K. Archer & Co., ix S.E.C. 635 (1942), aff'd, 133 F.zd 795 (8th .Cir.
1943) i Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 2z S.E.C. 865 (1946). Cf. Indiana State Securities
Corp., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5602, Nov. iS, 1957.
'2 Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865 (1946).
"W. K. Archer & Co., ix 'S.E.C. 635 (1942), aff'd, 133 F.2d 795 (8th Cir.
1943).
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security and attempt to effect the transaction as the agent for the cus-
tomer at the best obtainable price.
Eliminating the "thin market," which probably is per se a con-
trolled and dominated market, does the over-the-counter specialist ef-
fecting a large percentage of the transactions in a security dominate
and control the market? In the Norris & Hirshberg case, the Com-
mission indicated otherwise if the possibility of an independent market
arising exists and if the specialist is selling and buying to and from other
dealers and informed customers, stating in this regard :84
Every over-the-counter dealer who "specializes" in a security, in the sense
that he effects a high percentage of the transactions in the security, and in the
sense that he is the principal buyer and seller and is most familiar with the
affairs of the issuer and the state of the market, to some extent dominates the
market in that security. His trading volume may be the backbone of the
market in the security and his determination to pay more or less may be
determinative of market movements. However, to the extent that he does
business with dealers or with informed members of the public who have
access to information about issuers and quotations and can weigh investment
in the security as against investment in others, and to the extent that there
exists the possibility of an independent market in the security, the over-the-
counter specialist's decisions about pricing are subject to the check of free and
competitive forces.
Despite this decision, in M. S. Wien & Co., the Commission
appeared to use "dominate" as being synonomous with "making the
market," stating: "..... Although there appears to have been a small
amount of independent buying interest, respondent knew that it domi-
nated and was, in fact, making the market in Phoenix debentures .... 3 5
There were other activities more characteristic of the traditional manipu-
lation present in the Wien case. However, in the Daniels case,8 which
was uncontested, the evidence merely established that the dealer traded
the particular security and was almost wholly responsible for the quo-
tations in the Sheets. The Commision found: " ..... Thus the mar-
ket.., was maintained and dominated by registrant . ,M
The S. T. Jackson & Co. case 8 gives little comfort to the over-the-
counter specialist. The tabulation summarizing trading activities of
" Norris & Hirshberg, Inc. 21 S.E.C. 865, 874-75 (1946).
" M. S. Wien & Co., 24 S.E.C. 4, 13 (x946),. See also Sterling Sec. Co., Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 61oo, Nov. z, 1959.
" Daniels & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5549, July 18, 1957.
37 ibid.
s 36 S.E.C. 631 (1950).
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our fictional dealer above is an adaptation of a similar table relied on
in large part by the Commission in finding that Jackson & Co., con-
trolled and dominated the market.39 The Jackson case purported to
rely on the Norris & Hirshberg case and perhaps can be reconciled
with the language of that case on the basis that no real possibility of an
independent market arising existed in the Jackson case. The Commis-
sion has found no violation with respect to the trading activities of a
dealer making the primary (but not exclusive) market in a security,
effectuating approximately two-thirds of the trades, and being the only
dealer in the Sheets for approximately two months, where considerable
activity by other dealers subsequently developed.40 On the other
hand, the fact that twelve dealers placed quotations in the Sheets has
not precluded the Commission from finding that a particular dealer
controlled and dominated the market.41
Primary markets in many over-the-counter securities do not conform
to the textbook concept of pure competition, in which no one person at
any time determines the market price. The dealer making the primary
market must at any given time determine bid and ask prices and the
size of his inventory or short position, which determinations may result
in lowering or raising the price. Nonetheless, he is subject to competi-
tive forces, in that if he performs his function properly, his price will
be responsive to supply and demand. If the dealer, for example, makes
his market fourteen cents bid and eighteen cents ask and has a large
number of buyers and few sellers at these prices, he cannot indefinitely
buy stock at fourteen cents per share. Ideally, he seeks to find a price
level at which supply and demand are in balance. The fact that the
dealer has participated in a large percentage of the transactions does
not establish that he failed to perform this function. It is only when
the dealer attempts arbitrarily to raise, lower, or maintain prices that
there is a stage-managed performance.41a
The foregoing view and ideal of a dealer making a primary mar-
ket, as merely acting as a conduit from buyer to seller (and seller to
buyer), may be naYve in the light of the actual trading practices of many
"Id. at 661.
40 Edgerton, Wykoff & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 563, Dec. 7, 955.
"Gob Shops of America, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 4075, May 6, 1959.
The Commission, however, appe~xs to regard the exercise of discretion by a dealer
in determining his market quotation the equivalent of arbitrarily established prices, stat-
ing, "We find that .. .registrant . .. fixed the prices of such stock .. . [and] .. .
trade[d] with their customers on the basis of such arbitrarily established prices." Sterling
Sec. Co., Securities Exchange Act Release 61oo, Nov. 2, 1959.
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dealers. Although empirical data is not available, it is likely that many
dealers are generally trading against a long position and are bullish con-
cerning the future price trend of the security. Merely to attempt, in
effect, to match buy and sell orders involves risks that many dealers
are not willing to assume. It may be helpful with this background to
examine particular trading practices, in an effort to distinguish between
normal trading practices and activities designed artificially to establish
prices.
V
NORMALCY AND ABNORMALCY IN THE MARKETPLACE
Natural Resources, Inc., stock, as has been noted, was offered to the
public at ten cents per share. Prior to the public offering, there was no
trading market in the security. The X Company, as underwriter, prob-
ably started with a short position, for typically an effort is made to over-
sell an issue and thereby provide buying support upon commencement
of trading. All other factors being equal, the trader would normally
open the market at that offering price-e.g., nine cents bid-ten cents
ask, or at a quotation straddling the offering price-e.g., nine cents bid-
eleven cents ask. However, the trader for the X Company opened
the market at eleven cents bid-sixteen cents ask, or six cents above the
public offering price. The trader was influenced in this decision by the
fact that (i) the X Company was short the security, (2) considerably
more buying than selling interest was evident, and (3) trading had
developed at these higher levels away from him. This type of situation
would normally occur only with respect to an issue that has been over-
subscribed. The Commission's staff apparently will regard with sus-
picion, at least when coupled with other circumstances, the opening of
a market at an ask price substantially above the public offering price.4"
In the Jackson case, the Commission considered the following
trading practices as being particularly significant:
i. On not less than eight occasions (during an eight-month period),
the respondent dealer engaged in purchase transactions (for its cus-
tomer) that raised the market price of the security.
" Brief for the Division of Trading and Exchanges, In the Matter of Sterling
Securities Co., S.E.C. Docket Nos. 8-4738, 8-5485, 8-486o. The Commission, while
not emphasizing the opening quotation, regarded as significant the fact that "... during
the first day's trading registrant advanced the price to 21 cents per share, which was
more than twice the Regulation A offering price. Sterling Sec. Co., Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 61oo, Nov. 2, 1959.
[Vol. i96o: x96
2. No time was allowed to intervene between the price-raising trans-
actions and the dealer's own sales.
3. The dealer increased the price of the security over the previous
transaction in cross-transactions between customers.
4. The dealer repurchased shares from other dealers and from
customers at prices higher than such customers and dealers had pre-
viously paid respondent dealer.
Although there were other factors in the Jackson case, as discussed
below, the particular practices listed above are characteristic of any
dealer's activities in a rising market. If, for example, demand exceeds
supply and the dealer is attempting to purchase the security for a cus-
tomer (or to fill his trading needs), the dealer may have to pay more
than the price of the last transaction. 43 Further, if he is to continue
trading in the security, he will have to sell shares at a price above his
price for the last transaction, 4 and if the market continues to rise, he
" Although difficult to determine from the discussion, it appears that in the Jackson
case, the broker-dealer at the time of the price-raising transactions was actually relying
primarily on another dealer's market. Assume, for example, the other dealer's market
had been 13/ ask, xi bid, and the last transaction took place at xY2; the respondent-
dealer, acting as agent for his customer, bid 'Y. for the customer and thereby raised
the price by /s of a dollar. In another instance, the dealer apparently sold the se-
curity as principal to the customer from inventory at $z.oo when his (or other dealers')
markets had previously been, for example, 'Y8 ask, iY8 bid, and the last transaction
had taken place at x/8. As to the agency transaction, it is quite conceivable that al-
though the market had been Y2 ask, i; bid, that the broker-dealer acting for his
customer was unable to find stock available at -/i, and in order to obtain the stock,
had to bid x/s. As to the principal transaction, assuming a market of 17/ ask, I4'
bid, if the dealer is, on balance, short at this quotation-that is, he is selling more
shares than he is buying-it is obviously appropriate to raise his market to, e.g., $z.oo
ask, % bid. Nonetheless, raising the bid price, buying at the higher bid price, and
placing increasing bid prices in the Sheets are relied on in large part by the Commission
in finding a manipulation. Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. V9 (x94i); Harry Marks, 25
S.E.C. zo8 (1947); Adams & Co., 33 S.E.C. 444 (195z); R. L. Emacio & Co., 35
S.E.C. 19"(1953). The Commission has stated ,. . . .The insertion of increasingly
higher bids in the sheets is the most universally employed device to create a false ap-
pearance of activity in the over-the-counter market .... " Gob Shops of America, Inc.,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4075, May 6, 1959.
"If the dealer is both buying and selling, as he ordinarily is, this is obviously true
if his last transaction was a purchase, for the dealer is in the business of selling at a
profit. Turning to the agency transaction described in note 43 supra, if the broker, in
good faith, had to pay another dealer iY8 in filling his customer's order, then he
would appear to be justified in making his market at 0/s ask or higher. It might
have been appropriate in this context to determine whether the broker had been. in-
structed to act as agent. What the Commission is inferring is that the broker de-
liberately acted as agent and deliberately reached for stock at a higher price in order to
establish a higher price level, at which he could then sell shares as principal to his
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may very well find himself repurchasing shares from persons who
purchased the shares from him for less.45 As to the cross-transactions
at a price above the previous purchase, if the dealer's market is, for
example, fourteen cents bid--eighteen cents ask and he receives an
agency order to sell at sixteen cents and an agency order to buy at six-
teen cents, there appears to be no reason why he should not cross the
transaction at sixteen cents, even if it results in a price above his last
purchase.4"
The thrust of the market activities that are generally viewed with
suspicion is to raise the price of the security. In the Jackson case, the
Commission appeared to regard price-raising in itself as condemnable,
without distinguishing the trading situation from the classical situation,
in which the dealer is constantly buying at increasing prices for inven-
tory (and thereby restricting the floating supply) rather than for trad-
ing purposes. There were, however, other factors in the Jackson case
that undoubtedly affected the Commission's analysis. For example, the
dealer bought shares for his customer in a transaction that raised the
price of the security at a time when he could have covered the trans-
action from his inventory.47 There was also evidence of the fact that
customers. With respect to the principal transaction referred to in note 43 supra, if
the dealer raises his market for the reason stated, he must obviously continue to sell at
the increased ask price.
' Undoubtedly the X Company in this situation would have repurchased shares at
the higher price level from prior purchasers willing to take their profit.
"e The Jackson case situation is not too clear, but apparently the broker had obtained
agency orders to buy at 4 and to sell at 4 when the quotation immediately pre-
ceding the last transaction had been 7./ ask-a bid. It is quite conceivable that stock
was no longer available at 2/s and 2% was the best available price. That this may
have been the situation is indicated by the footnote acknowledgment that the market
away from the respondent dealer reached 4/2 on the same date. S. T. Jackson & Co.,
Inc., 36 S.E.C. 63x, 65z n.44 (1950). It is also possible, assuming a principal transac-
tion, that the market had been z ask-x/s bid, and the dealer had effectuated his last sale
at $2.oo and then raised his market to 24-$2.oo because of his position in the security
or other factors tending to indicate more demand than supply. In this situation, if he
should receive orders on both sides which are inside his quotation (e.g., he has a would-
be seller at 2z'6 and a would-be buyer at 2y), he undoubtedly will and should cross
transactions.
,
7
.An analysis of this transaction requires consideration of certain factors that were
not discussed in the case. Assume a 1?/ ask-iY8 bid market that because of the
market situation, becomes a 2as ask-i7/ bid market by a broker-dealer who receives
an agency buy order from a customer at $2.oo. The broker-dealer's market now be-
comes (at least until he completes this transaction) 2Y8 ask, 2 bid (the bid being, in
effect, made for his customer). If the broker succeeds in completing this transaction
for the customer, he has raised the price of the security over the prior xT6 ask price,
as he would have with respect to the first sale made at the higher quotation. What the
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on five days, other dealers effected transactions for customers at prices
lower than Jackson effected transactions for its customers. Although
not present in the Jackson case, the Commission has looked askance at
a dealer raising his bid price to or above the price at which he was con-
temporaneously selling the security short.48
The Commission has quite correctly regarded the concentration of
securities in a few hands as a situation that restricts the floating supply
of the security.49 On the other hand, it has also regarded the distribu-
tion of securities to a large number of persons, each buying a small
number of shares, as part of a pattern designed to restrict the floating
supply.50 This seems somewhat incredible, particularly in the light of
the fact that the bulk of the securities involved came from the alleged
manipulator, who obviously would control the floating supply better by
retaining the securities in inventory. The Commission seems to have
been influenced by the fact tfiat a portion' of the securities involved came
from a number of investors who the dealer knew were desirous of
selling and went to persons who obviously had a less immediate desire
to sell. This, of course, is characteristic of any market, in that it is 'not
possible to have a market without having both persons willing to sell
as well as persons willing to buy. There was an obvious motive for
manipulation present in this case as well as other incriminating cir-
cumstances.
There are many practices that are indicative of the fact that the
dealer is not attempting to tamper with market forces, but rather is
controlled by them. Paticularly significant are the following:
i. The dealer not only raises his bids, but as the occasion demands,
he lowers his bids.51
Commission apparently is suggesting in this situation is that so long as the dealer has
an inventory (a long ,position), the dealer must justify any increase of the market price
by him as a dealer or in effectuating agency transactions for customers.
As Gob Shops of America, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 4075, May 6, 1959. Al-
though the inference drawn by the Commission was probably a reasonable one under the
circumstances, the market situation could change so rapidly that a dealer is bidding a
higher price than the price at which he sold the security a few minutes earlier.
"9Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 319, 327 (i94x), in which the Commission defined the
floating supply of a stock as "that part of the issue which is outstanding and which is
held by dealers and the public with a view to resale for a trading profit, as distinguished
from that part of the stock held for investment." Withholding agreements designed to
limit and control the supply must be disclosed. SEC v. Otis & Co. 18 F. Supp. zoo
(N.D. Ohio 1936).
:*Gob Shops of America, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 4075, May 6, 1959.
'Edgerton, Wykoff & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5z63, Dec. 7., x955".
Sales contemporaneous with purchases have been considered as a factor in finding no
manipulation. Harold T. White and Francis M. Weld, 3 S.E.C. 466 (x938).
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2. The dealer is not only long in the security, but from time to
time, he is truly short in the security-i.e., he has no assured supply. 2
3. The dealer is not buying a significant amount of the security in
excess of what is needed to fill demand. He is continually and con-
temporaneously selling as well as buying the security.
However, the fact that the dealer is attempting to stabilize or main-
tain the price of a security, as distinguished from raising the price, is
not ordinarily a defense in manipulation cases. 8 This type of market
interference is permitted in certain situations, but only in the appro-
priate situation and when undertaken in conformity with the stabiliza-
tion rules adopted by the Commission."s
VI
STIMULANTS PROHIBITED
There is another important element very much present in many
alleged over-the-counter manipulation situations. Although the Com-
mission has not expressly said so, this may be the distinguishing factor
in many instances. Dealers, as we have noted, may be wholesale dealers,
retail dealers, or a combination of both. An over-the-counter manipu-
lation frequently involves a dealer who not only makes a principal (if
not the only) market in the security, but also retails the security. A
considerable portion of the demand for the security is likely to have
been generated by the efforts of the dealer's sales force, which is mer-
chandising the security against the dealers long position. If the dealer
sells at retail a security that he positions, he may have induced, through
his salesmen, the publication of optimistic reports, and the like, a sub-
stantial portion of the demand for the security. This demand results
in raising the price of the security, and the rising price in itself gen-
erates additional demand from people expecting the price to go even
2 The Commission has held that this fact was not sufficient in the circumstances of
the particular cases to preclude drawing the inference that the dealer controlled and
dominated the market. Gob Shops of America, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 4075,
May 6, 1959. Although the Commission did not rely on this fact, the fact that
the dealer had warrants from the Company to purchase 86,iiS shares, when its short
position was approximately 26,ooo shares, was undoubtedly significant, even though the
dealer would have undoubtedly violated the registration provisions of the Securities
Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (295z), if these shares were used to
cover the short position.
"'Masland, Fernon, & Anderson, 9 S.E.C. 338 (i94x). But cf. Harold T. White
& Francis M. Weld, 3 S.E.C. 466 (938).
5448 Stat. 889 (x934)
, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(6) (195) ; 27 C.F.R. § 24o.IoB-7
(19ss); Loss, op. cit. supra note x, at 922.
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higher. At the same time, the increased price produces a supply of
stock to supplement the dealer's inventory from persons willing to take
their profits.
In practice, all may not work out in this manner, or there may be
variations of the pattern. A sufficient supply of stock may not be forth-
coming, in which event the dealer soon finds himself in a substantial
short position. To realize a profit in this situation, the dealer must actu-
ally look for a decrease in the price of the stock to the point where he 'an
cover his short position at a profit, or take his loss on the initial trading
and recoup the loss and earn a profit at the new and higher price level.
The Commission's staff in this situation is likely to look for a secret
source of supply to the dealer, fictitious trading accounts, trading ac-
counts in the name of a nominee, etc.
The focus of attention in this area should be (but has not been) the
manner in which the demand has been created. The manipulation
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contain a seldom-
used provision designed directly to attack stimulated demand. It is
unlawful, in effect, while trading in a security, to make a false or mis-
leading statement of a material fact relating to the security.55 The
Commission's staff has usually not undertaken the difficult task of prov-
ing false or misleading statements as such. In many instances, since
the representations are usually oral, recollections are vague, or the
representations are primarily puffing or statements of opinion, a tra-
ditional fraud case would be difficult to prove. Or, indeed, in many
instances, the representations as such are not actionable. The Commis-
sion's staff in such cases is likely to allege fraud because of failure to
disclose the alleged control and domination of the market. Although
this has never been articulated, what the staff appears really to be com-
plaining about in these cases is the failure-to disclose that the dealer,
while making a primary market in a security, has stimulated the demand
for the security.
The status of the law in this area is anything but clear. Stimulation
of the demand undoubtedly has been an influencing, if not decisive, but
inarticulate factor in the decisions in which the Commission has done
little more than cite a conglomeration of statistics relating to the trading
in the security and conclude that the respondent controlled and domi-
nated the market. Such statistics frequently have proven, if anything,
rs48 Stat. 889 (1934), - 5 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(3) (195±); 48 Stat. 895 (-934), i5
U.S.C. § 780(C) () (1952) i 7 C.F.R. z4o.1 5 C 1-Z (19+9) ; Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C.
319 (94).
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no more than that the dealer was the principal market in the security
during a given period of time.
The Commission made an early effort to establish that deliberate
stimulation of demand through the dissemination of information and
recommendations constituted a violation of section nine of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. A district court, in fact, subscribed to the theory
that such acts violated section nine because they were designed "... to
draw in other persons who would be attracted by increased activity at
rising prices. . . ."' Section nine precludes a person, alone or with
other persons, from effecting a series of transactions in a security for
this purpose. To reach the position of the court noted above, it is
necessary to conclude, in the absence of actual transactions by the re-
spondent, that the respondent effected such transactions by inducing
other persons to purchase the security. The Commission has not applied
the same logic to the over-the-counter situation, but has regarded as a
significant part of the over-all pattern of control and domination the
fact that the bulk of the demand resulted from an intensive sales cam-
paign by the dealer's thirty-five-man sales force. 57  In the Jackson
case, reliance was placed by the Commission on representations made
by the salesmen relating to the Company's business prospects and the
potential market value of the security. The Commission concluded
that such representations were false, which in itself constitutes a viola-
tion, aside from any control and domination question.
The Norris & Hirshberg case, as previously noted, suggested that a
dealer does not unlawfully dominate the market because he is the prin-
cipal market to the extent that he does business with informed cus-
tomers and the possibility that an independent market exists."" This
suggests that combining retail business with the making of a principal
" SEC v. Torr, 15 F. Supp. 35, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1936). Although the court
used this language in referring to the effect of the dealer's recommendations, there were,
in fact, significant purchase transactions by the dealer.
57 Gob Shops of America, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 4075, May 6, 1959. The
Commission has also talked in terms of a free market as being something other than a
stimulated market: ". . . the manipulator's design in raising prices is to create the
appearance that a free market is supplying demand whereas the demand in fact comes
from his planned purpose to stimulate buyers' interest." Halsey, Stuart & Co., Inc.,
30 S.E.C. io6, xiz 0940)
" It is interesting to note that the Commission has held that other dealers and in-
formed customers are entitled to rely on representations (usually implied ones) as to the
market being a free and competitive one. Russell Maguire & Co., Inc., xo S.E.C. 332
(1941); M. S. Wien & Co., 24 S.E.C. 4 (1946); Halsey, Stuart & Co., 30 S.E.C.
io6 (1949). Yet, whether the market is a free and competitive one may, as noted in
the text, depend on the degree of sophistication of the particular dealer's customers.
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market is not per se defectivei however, doing business in this type of
situation with customers posing special trust and confidence in the dealer
("fiduciary protected customers") may be fatal. Although in the con-
text of the case "informed customers" appears to refer to anyone other
than the "fiduciary protected customer," the Commission's staff appar-
ently would apply this concept to a market in which the dealer making
the primary market generates demand by soliciting relatively unin-
formed (but not "fiduciary protected") persons.
VII
THE SUBTLE MOTIVE
The traditional manipulator has an apparent motive-namely, to
dispose of a bloc of stock at manipulated prices. The manipulator may
own the stock, may have it under option, or may be the proposed
underwriter of a new issue of the security. In many instances, the
existence of an obvious motive to increase the price of the stock coupled
with the fact of such increase may largely induce the fact-finder to
draw an inference of domination and control from inconclusive data.59
The motive the Commission's staff discerns in control and domina-
tion by a dealer making a primary market is the desire for trading
profits. This, of course, is the objective of all dealers making a market
in a security, and, accordingly, all dealers are suspect in this regard. If,
as is likely, dealers making a primary market are, on balance, long in
the security-that is, they generally are buying slightly more shares
than they are selling-their desire for a rising market is apparent. If
the dealer is not long in the security, he may have a known source of
supply of the stock from certain large stockholders, which reduces his
risk. The dealer may have an apparent short position, but, in fact, have
fictitious or nominee accounts or an arrangement by which he knows he
can cover his short position by purchases from a holder of a large bloc
of stock. Further, an active trading market is likely to be a profitable
trading market, particularly if the price trend is upward. Hence, the
constant interest of dealers in stimulating demand.
Although the Commission's staff as the proponent of an order has the burden of
proof under the Administrative Procedure Act, 6o Stat. 241 (940), 5 U.S.C. § 1007(c)
(1952), the Commission has generally found a violation in all instances in which a
motive for manipulation exists. See cases in notes 24, 25 aS8 29, & 41 sura. Cf. the
inference-drawing function as performed by a court in SEC v. Andrew S., I S.E.C.
Jud. Dec. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
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VIII
THE DELICATE ART
The classical manipulation requires little expertise to comprehend.
However, trading in securities, to the extent it involves making a
primary market, is an art requiring considerable finesse. Expertise in
this area cannot be acquired by anything other than actual experience.
The trader makes numerous quick decisions, many of them under con-
ditions of stress and tension. The trader does not have available data
reflecting actual transactions by other dealers and does not know many
important facts, such as size, concerning the market being made by a
competitor. He must gauge supply and demand at various price levels,
with a reasonable degree of accuracy. In the event his activities become
the subject of an inquiry, he will be judged by a record painstakingly
constructed over a period of considerable time, involving, in retrospect,
a picture of the market not available to him at the time he made the
particular decision in question. Further, he will be judged by statutory
experts, who perforce tread where others would be reluctant to break
ground without more empirical data.°0
A trader must have a delicate feel for a market situation. Under cer-
tain circumstances, an increase in the market price may stimulate demand
because investors regard such increase as an indication that the price will
go higher; under other circumstances, it may be a deterrent to further
buying. He may be short in a security because he expects the price to
go down, or he may be short in the security because he is unable to buy
the security at his current bid price. He may sense the direction of
the market, in which event he will follow one pattern; or he may feel
that he does not know in which direction the market will move next, in
which event he will follow another pattern. 1
0" Thus, without any empirical evidence in the record to support such conclusions,
the Commission has concluded that each of the following is indicative of a controlled
and dominated market: (i) to solicit sales while short in the security; (z) to sell short
at increasingly higher prices despite a small floating supply; (3) consistently to main-
tain a large spread between bid and ask prices; (4) and to maintain a spread between
bid and ask prices sufficient to permit covering a short position at a profit in a rising
market. Sterling Sec. Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6xoo, Nov. 2, 1959.
"l In this situation, the dealer is likely to attempt to minimize his risk by having a
wide spread between his bid and ask price. He does so, however, at his peril inasmuch
as the Commission will regard a large spread as indicative of a controlled and domi-
nated market. Sterling Sec. Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6xoo, Nov. z,
1959. A dealer not too eager to make an active market will also have a wide spread,
as he is looking primarily for orders he can offset against each other.
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CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to analyze "control and domination"
cases by isolating pertinent elements. We, indeed, may be in an area
where the complete picture adds up to more than the sum of the isolated
parts. Nonetheless, inasmuch as a great deal of the activity involved
is characteristic of trading practices generally, it is imperative that the
Commission face squarely the type of activity that it desires to condemn.
The security dealer needs a degree of latitude in trading that can-
not be bounded by arbitrary restrictions. The ingenuity of the market
manipulator, on the other hand, has undoubtedly made the Commis-
sion reluctant to confine itself to any narrow definition of "control and
domination." Nonetheless, ground rules on certain fundamental ques-
tions of policy are badly needed, as a guide both to the dealer and also
to the Commission in the drawing of intelligent inferences concerning
the impact and purport of market activities.
The Commission's staff is rapidly moving, as we have seen, toward
a position that raises serious problems for securities dealers making pri-
mary markets. Not only is the Commission, too, arriving at such a
position, but unfortunately it is doing so in a manner that does not make
clear the fact of and the reasons for this movement. Involved are
policy problems having a widespread impact on the securities industry
which are being resolved in administrative adjudication rather than
through the exercise of the rule-making power. Although an adminis-
trative agency can, in effect, legislate by adjudication, despite the fact
that a minority of the Supreme Court has characterized such practice as
"administrative authoritarianism," 62 an administrative agency, unlike a
court, also has the rule-making power, and many would conclude that
policy can more effectively and fairly evolve through use of this power.
To legislate by administrative adjudication involves an element of retro-
activity that, while lawful, imposes particular hardships on the litigants
and is not designed as effectively to permit the presentation of all the
factors so essential to informed policy formulation. The decisions being
made in this area frequently involve respondents who are penny-stock
dealers, financially irresponsible dealers, or generally disreputable
dealers. Nonetheless, there cannot be a double standard of principles
applicable to dealers, and the principles involved have real and sub-
stantial import for the respectable dealers as well.
"
2 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, z6 (1947).
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If the Commission were to approach the problem by rule-making,
at least four tacks should be considered:
i. To provide that a dealer must disclose in all transactions (or at
least all retail transactions) the fact that he is the principal (or only)
market in a particular security. This is a disclosure approach.
2. To prohibit a dealer making a market in a security from also
buying and selling the security on a retail level. This approach, in
effect, substantially precludes a dealer from stimulating demand in a
security being positioned by it.
3. To require a dealer to act only as agent in retail transactions
involving a security in which he makes a principal market. This is
somewhere between disclosure and absolute prohibition, requiring, in
effect, completion of retail transactions through another dealer.13
4. To do nothing, relying on Norris & Hirshberg and section 9(4)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
One of the principal issues to be resolved is the extent to which
dealers are to be permitted to stimulate demand of a security in which
they trade by the dissemination of information. Secondarily, customers
are undoubtedly entitled to know that the dealer is the principal
market, and hence that if the dealer voluntarily or otherwise discon-
tinues trading in the security, there may not be a market for the security.
Yet, realistically, it is doubtful whether such disclosure would have any
substantial impact on trading decisions. In the last analysis, the only
real protection to the investor may well be more effective policing of
the representations being made in order to stimulate demand.
"1 This does not entirely eliminate the incentive for a manipulation, as evidenced by
the many manipulation cases involving listed securities where this, in effect is required.
See case cited supra note 24. Moreover, at least one over-the-counter manipulation
case involved a broker-dealer effecting many transactions for customers as their agent.
S. T. Jackson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 631, 652 (1950).
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